Could the area the UMTS module sits on the board be made in a way for adding the module back on afterwards if say the consumer decides, after purchasing, 3G/4G without a USB dongle is what they'd rather have?
There is no way to avoid the basic problem of trust, unless you build the device completely from scratch yourself, which is impossible (I mean not just assembly, but also designing and building every little component).
Maybe you don't trust the 3G module, so you add a kill switch to cut power to it. Assuming that you never turn it on (because the second you turn it on, who knows what it starts broadcasting to the NSA, right?), you still have to trust that the kill switch actually kills the power to the 3G module, that there is no tiny little battery embedded in the module, etc. Maybe you do some measurements with some instrument to verify things, but can you trust the measurement instrument? Etc. etc. all the way to "maybe this is all an illusion and we are living in the Matrix".
There is no way to avoid that. So don't worry too much, be reasonable and pick your fights. It makes much more sense for intelligence agencies to put backdoors in mainstream devices and key nodes of the network, than to bother with a niche device like this. Sure, the 3G module could be compromised, and the CPU, and maybe they even put some subtle backdoors in some linux drivers. To be 100% sure, you shouldn't use anything, ever.
True again. Besides, life is way too short to worry about most of the trivial things and fears people latch onto and call important.
I had a night out early this week with my young nieces at a local hibachi sushi restaurant, and I'm still grinning remembering all the fun they/we had.
There is no way to avoid the basic problem of trust, unless you build the device completely from scratch yourself, which is impossible (I mean not just assembly, but also designing and building every little component).
Maybe you don't trust the 3G module, so you add a kill switch to cut power to it. Assuming that you never turn it on (because the second you turn it on, who knows what it starts broadcasting to the NSA, right?), you still have to trust that the kill switch actually kills the power to the 3G module, that there is no tiny little battery embedded in the module, etc. Maybe you do some measurements with some instrument to verify things, but can you trust the measurement instrument? Etc. etc. all the way to "maybe this is all an illusion and we are living in the Matrix".
There is no way to avoid that. So don't worry too much, be reasonable and pick your fights. It makes much more sense for intelligence agencies to put backdoors in mainstream devices and key nodes of the network, than to bother with a niche device like this. Sure, the 3G module could be compromised, and the CPU, and maybe they even put some subtle backdoors in some linux drivers. To be 100% sure, you shouldn't use anything, ever.
Could the area the UMTS module sits on the board be made in a way for adding the module back on afterwards if say the consumer decides, after purchasing, 3G/4G without a USB dongle is what they'd rather have?
Connect the device to WiFi - generally traceable via ISP.
Connect the device to WAN - definitely traceable by GPS and antenna.
There is no such thing as an 'anonymous' data connection. Not saying it's right or wrong - just a fact. Yes, you can use an encrypted path to a server that bounces your direct page query to an anonymous server, but the actual connection of your device to the internet is never truly anonymous - all connected devices leave a trace somewhere.
So - the concern must be whether the device is traceable when 'not connected' - and knowing 100% that it is not connected. Advantages to this would be preventing location association links (two or more devices in proximity) and general location and route traces.
The module generates an electrical signal to excite an antenna. Without the antenna the signal would be dramatically attenuated - to the point where signal distance would be measured in cm instead of km. It is likely a relatively low voltage signal.
How about a GPIO controlled antenna disconnect? If the module self-powers for some nefarious purpose, 'the man' would need to be standing next to you with an antenna pointed at your pocket to pick up the signal.
No reboot needed - as far as the module knows it's 'situation normal' - it simply can't find anything to talk to.
How about a GPIO controlled antenna disconnect? If the module self-powers for some nefarious purpose, 'the man' would need to be standing next to you with an antenna pointed at your pocket to pick up the signal.
No reboot needed - as far as the module knows it's 'situation normal' - it simply can't find anything to talk to.
That's something to be looked at.I'm not sure whether an electronic switch to do that would be expensive, but it would probably need to carry less current, wouldn't it?
Personally, I trust the module. But if there is a $3 way to satisfy the very paranoid ones too, then I would go for it.
Worrying about 3g modems being off or on, even ones that are standalone, is warranted. Triangulization is real, records are real, patterns are kept.
Connecting them to anything, a base platform that may be comprimized, is also a honest concern.
Also, security does not stop at the OS level, you can encrypt your information further, and towards the internet the same holds true.
Saying "dont get a 3g modem" and "dont connect to the internet" as means of security is a fundementally flawed view.
As described in game theory, trust in trust is also a flawed perception.
The extention of which is as surreal as the premise is ignorant.
Just as implementing surefire ways of telling that there isnt anything going on, beyond removing the battery, isnt really feasible, nor very fruitful.
To make an informed analysis, i think if you were to discard both OS security, encryption layers on and off, and specialize it enough to turn off Leds and AT command outputs, you are looking at an attack vector
for which getting a 3g modem is just the wrong approach for.
Lets not forget that these people exist, and the people who want their data also do. Which one you side with is largely irrelevant, i want my anonymity because that is mine to begin with.
In between there is a whole heap of marketing and bullshit i just dont want to deal with, so at any level, the bulk of everyone is a target for malice.
Trivial data doesnt exist, it can always be combined with other "trivial" things to produce worrying results. The full implications of this are bad enough, and will only get worse.
I like the 0 ohm smd resistor on the modem power line because then you can implement a switch if need be, that goes a long way.
"don't connect to the internet" is actually the only way to be sure no information gets out, but you would also need to make sure to disable stuff like Bluetooth because after all every other Bluetooth device near you could be compromised and then you would be connected anyway.
If we have a hardware off switch, then someone could boot read-only images (with no consistent data) and reboot between no-internet->secure sessions and internet-public/snooped sessions.
But that would be a pain in the ass.
And security can stop at the OS level insofar as you are fucked if the OS is compromised. In principle it's like this: Hardware<Software, Low-Level<High-Level, so SoC<Processor<Linux<Gnu<normal user programs (incomplete list, of course). If a level is compromised all higher levels are compromised too, but not necessarily something on the same or lower level.
Doing the best of everything, and having galvanic seperations between every step of the OSI model is good. It might be theoretically impossible, but the winning move then becomes as good as possible within limits of reason.
Shipping a non-integrated (into SoC) modem and a 0ohm smd resistor on the power line is about as much anyone could ask for considering this is an internal modem which is also optional.
But as Grench said, for many it is not about what can be transmitted by a compromised system, but simply about being definitely in control of when to be traceable by cell towers. This data is automatically gathered and stored for some not so short amount of time and readily available to the police and other organizations. No compromised system or directed attack is neccessary to become a target (which from experience is unpleasant even if innocent).
For me the LED idea would be great, I like status leds, though I probably wouldn't take the modem, since a phone is still more portable and the Pyra will become even heavier (at least with the larger battery).
But is it necessary for it to be hardwired to the power line so that it will always and forever turn on when in use (assuming you trust Michael and Nikolaus) with no way to compromise it (short of physically cutting it)? Or do you trust the OS enough that if you tell it to turn on an LED when the module powers up?
I would not have a problem with it but I want people to understand what they're getting into if they do think it's a good idea. You would not be able to replace it with just any old switch, it is there for you to cut and then resolder as needed.
Again wanna remind every paranoid out there, that if you paranoia is "so serious" that you cant even trust a OS, you always can short the 3G module.
All we need is that the contacts are available, and are not hidden anywhere seriously.
Finally, if you don't wanna go that deep, i still can purpose a low-cost and almost non-mechanical way:
Make 2 terminals for both - and + of the 3g module power available from outside of the console, with a small tiny, vertical hole between the 2. (Inside, the hole is round).
With the Pyra, you will get a tiny bit which you "insert and turn till it clicks", which will short the 2 terminals together, making sure whatever is there, its no longer powered.
As i know posts with pictures are much more popular :3333:
(Public Domain image)
"normal human beings" can either forget it at hole, either just throw it away
while paranoids can have this thing together, and if they really "care" they will keep it safe.
As well as if you lose/break/forget it, a drop of solder, or anything else can easily switch off the 3g modem if you really need to.
To "complaints about them metal keys in the pockets" which i predict:
1) Do you actually care if its in you pocket and you don't use it anyway?
2) If properly done, you key should be "specially made" to short those 2 by accident.
I dont pretend my idea is genius, but i want it considered.
PS: I just realized i reinvented a wheel hardware switch..... But still... think about it.
PPS: If you find repeating lines in what i wrote, its my editor which was messed up restoring the post.
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